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ABSTRACT
This paper deals with Anglo-Spanish trade and finances for the period c.
1810-1850. It concentrates on the business activities of a London merchant
bank (Huth & Co. or Huth) with Spain during this period by paying special
attention to the support given by Huth to the many bilateral trades between
Spain and Britain in which the company participated. It also focuses on
the support given by Huth to much trade in and out of Spanish ports but
which did not go through British ports. This overall support included the
provision of credit facilities, exchange rate brokerage, insurance services and
commercial intelligence. In addition, the article covers the links between
Huth and the Spanish crown, thanks to which the bank became an important
conduit of Spanish investments in American securities before 1850. Huth
was also the paymaster abroad for the Spanish state. In view of Huth’s
close connections to the Spanish economy during this period, it is perhaps
surprising that this is the first study of this «Spanish» house in London.
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RESUMEN
El presente artı´culo trata sobre las conexiones comerciales y financieras
entre Espan˜a y Gran Bretan˜a para el perı´odo 1810-1850. El mismo se con-
centra en las actividades de negocio de un mercader banquero con sede
principal en Londres (Huth & Co.), y en particular en las relativas al apoyo
prestado por el mismo a diversos flujos comerciales entre Espan˜a y Gran
Bretan˜a. Pero el artı´culo tambie´n brinda atencio´n al suporte brindado a
importaciones y exportaciones espan˜olas que no pasaban por puertos brit-
a´nicos. Para estos fines Huth proveı´a muchos servicios a hombres de negocio
en Espan˜a y otros paı´ses, tales como cre´dito, seguros, e informacio´n
comercial. Adicionalmente, este ensayo versa sobre los nexos entre Huth y la
corona espan˜ola, gracias a los cuales dicho banquero se convirtio´ en uno de los
principales canales de inversiones espan˜olas en valores financieros en los EEUU
antes de 1850. Huth tambie´n estaba a cargo de pagar los sueldos en el extra-
njero de co´nsules y diploma´ticos espan˜oles. Considerando las conexiones tan
cercanas con la economı´a espan˜ola durante este perı´odo, resulta sorprendente
que sea e´ste el primer estudio sobre ‘casas espan˜olas’ en Londres.
Palabras Clave: Comercio Anglo-Espan˜ol, Finanzas Anglo-Espan˜olas,
comerciantes-banqueros, siglo XIX, costes de transaccio´n
INTRODUCTION
The few available studies of Spanish foreign trade covering the period
from the end of the Napoleonic Wars until the mid-19th century concentrate
mainly on the following «macro» topics: Spain’s colonial trade and the
impact of the collapse of the Spanish empire on the Spanish economy; the
long-term impact of foreign trade on economic growth; general trends of
the overall performance of Spanish imports and exports; the changing
composition of Spanish exports, by products and geography; the impact of
the industrial revolution on Spanish foreign trade; and bilateral trades with
selected destinations. In addition, studies of Anglo-Spanish trade and
financial connections for this period focus mainly on the overall value
of exports, re-exports and imports (Fontana 1970; Cuenca-Esteban 1981;
Prados de la Escosura 1982a, 1982b, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986; Prados de la
Escosura and Tortella 1983).
Despite the importance of these studies to improve our understanding of
Spanish foreign trade and Anglo-Spanish economic relations soon after the
collapse of the Spanish American empire and until the mid-19th century, the
available historiography for this short period does not cultivate a global
history approach or a «micro» analysis of the main actors involved in Spain’s
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external trade, including London merchant bankers. In particular, the
important role played by trading and financial intermediaries in Spanish
foreign trade is a neglected area. Particularly striking is the lack of research
on the service sector. This is not surprising: the literature on international
business has been mainly concerned with manufacturing rather than
services (Jones 1998, p. 1). For example, the use of London intermediaries by
Spanish international traders is fully understandable in terms of transactions
cost theory but there is little mention, if any, of this factor within the extant
studies of Anglo-Spanish economic relations.
In turn, thanks to the general literature on merchant banking (Chapman
1984, 1992; Jones 1987, 2000), we know that London was financing
British foreign trade, including bilateral trade between Britain and Spain.
However, we were unaware of the important role played by London mer-
chant banks in financing Spanish trades that never docked at British ports.
Take for instance the main works by Chapman and Jones, in which there is
little mention of Spain (Chapman 1984, 1992; Jones 1987, 2000). Through a
case study it will be shown here that London was an important provider of
«market-making» and financial services to promote Spanish trades uncon-
nected to British ports. This situation is quite different from the picture
provided in the classic work of Chapman (Chapman 1984, pp. 8-9, 14-15), for
whom London merchant bankers «preferred to allow credit to agents
permanently resident in Britainy because experience had taught them that
the legal process of recovering debts abroad was impossibly expensive»
(Chapman 1992, p. 135). Likewise, Chapman himself provided evidence
showing that the earliest development of British merchant banking was in
connection with the United States to such an extent that in the late 1830s
about half of British acceptances were for Anglo-American trade (Chapman
1984, p. 105). Not surprisingly, acceptances for other markets have been
neglected. More importantly, this is relevant for our purposes here because
London’s credit was crucial in supporting trade between Spain and her
remaining colonies, as well as between Spain and other parts of the world
before 1850 at a time when Cuba, for example, ranked third among Spain’s
main export destinations and import origins (Prados de la Escosura 1982b,
pp. 211, 221).
Overall, we know little about London merchant banking in connection
with Spain before 1850, not only regarding trade-related issues, but also in
relation to the movement of securities. For example, important London
houses such as Huth & Co. (hereafter Huth), Darthez Brothers, Gower,
Sadler Whitmore and Mathiesen provided critical support to Spain’s foreign
trade and capital flows, but few of their archives have survived. Of these
merchant banks, the only major archive collection available for the period
1810-1850 is that of Huth. It is, therefore, unfortunate that we are not able to
compare the experiences of these London houses in order to explain why so
many merchants in Spain preferred to use the services of Huth over those of
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other merchants. According to Chapman, this situation is mainly because of
the fact that merchant bankers were peculiarly reluctant to commit their
stories to print (Chapman 1984, p. 169, 1992, p. xiii).
This neglect is relevant because a select number of London merchant
banks provided crucial services to Spanish merchants and other Spanish
businessmen before 1850. These services encompassed trading goods on
own/joint account, or obtaining consignments of products for themselves,
their agents or friends in Spain; trading in securities; financing Spanish
foreign trade and even financing the trade of securities into Spain; insurance
of Spanish imports and exports; negotiating foreign exchange rates or
getting acceptance of bills of exchange on behalf of Spanish merchants
resident in markets outside Britain; shipping services for Spanish merchants;
and issuing. That is, London merchant banks were important vehicles for
Spanish foreign trade but also for Spanish short-term foreign investment.
At this point it is important to stress that many of the services provided by
this select group of London merchant banks to Spanish businessmen were
not available in Spain, or at least not on better terms than they were in
Britain, as happened in many other underdeveloped markets of the world
before 1850. Why was this so in the particular case of Spain? Why could
Spanish merchant banks (or their equivalents) not compete effectively with
London’s merchant banks for some of these services? The answers to these
questions are given in this paper mainly using transaction cost theory as a
useful theoretical frame, supported by the literature on the theory of trading
companies, merchant banking and the relationship between trade and trust.
Finally, it is worth noting that some important Spanish merchants competed
with Huth and other London merchant bankers in the provision of a few
services such as the granting of advances and shipping services. I am not
putting forward the argument that London held a monopoly on all the ser-
vices offered by Huth to his Spanish connections. Although it would be
interesting to know why so many of Huth’s Spanish clients preferred his
services to, say, Ybarra of Bilbao, to answer this question fully we would
need to dig deeply into Spanish merchants’ archive collections which would
take several years of research and lead this investigation in a different
direction. That said, with the evidence available it is possible to make some
conjectures, which are provided below.
Therefore, this article, by concentrating on the commercial and financial
activities of a London merchant bank with Spain, sheds new light on London
merchant banking in the period between 1810 and 1850, in particular in
Spain, during a very important period in Spanish economic history, char-
acterised by a much-needed but difficult economic recovery after the loss of
most American colonies and Napoleon’s occupation. The article also pro-
vides new information about Anglo-Spanish trade and financial relations
during the early 19th century, as well as about Spanish foreign trade more
generally. Additionally, it increases our understanding of the global economy
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soon after the Napoleonic Wars, and the role played by London’s Spanish
connection in this global system of trade and networks.
Huth was a London-based merchant bank, which had been operating in
Britain since 1809. Huth’s early decades of activity constitute a very inter-
esting phase in British merchant banking because this period provided
«spectacular new opportunities for trade companies» in Britain (Chapman
1977, p. 7; Jones 2000, pp. 18-21). This situation was not only because of
increasing British industrial production. The period under study was pre-
ceded by a long period of warfare that had started with the American wars of
independence and was followed by the Napoleonic Wars and the Anglo-
American War of 1812. During these conflicts many British merchants either
retired, weary of so many disruptions to trade or went bankrupt for the same
reason, thus leaving plenty of room for newcomers, including Huth, to
prosper after 1815. Houses trading with Europe were particularly affected:
it is estimated that 90 per cent of London’s continental Europe houses
disappeared during the Napoleonic Wars (Chapman 1979, pp. 217-218, 1984,
p. 10, 1992, pp. 47-48, 68-70), to the great benefit of Huth, given his interests
in Spain.
However, Huth was no ordinary merchant bank during the first decades
after the Napoleonic Wars. It ranked immediately below the two leading
London merchant banks at that time: Baring Brothers and Rothschild (Jones
2004, pp. 1-2). Despite Huth’s pre-eminence within the London merchant-
banking community, and despite its pivotal role as far as the Spanish
economy is concerned, there is no specific work dealing with Huth’s activities
in Spain. This is the more surprising given that between 1812 and 1851 Huth
corresponded with at least 870 merchants or businessmen in Spain, located
in about 75 different cities or towns (Table 1). Furthermore, Frederick Huth
and his wife were well connected to the Spanish crown, which gave the bank
an edge over other London merchant banks as far as Spain was concerned. It
is true that the Rothschilds had more influence upon the Spanish economy,
but their activities were mainly linked to issuing rather than trade.
The richest primary source of information on Huth’s activities, and
therefore the main source of information for this article, is found in the
papers available at University College London (Special Collections). This
collection contains 183 volumes of letters from Huth for 1812-1855 and
about 70 folders of incoming correspondence for 1814-1850. Despite
this wealth of information, few scholars have used this collection, and they
have done so mainly in relation to Huth’s dealings with either the
United States or South America. I also consulted the papers at the Guildhall
Library and information relating to Huth in other collections such as the
Rothschild Archives.
This article consists of eight other sections. In the next section, I deal with
Huth’s origins as a merchant in Hamburg and Corunna. After this, I con-
centrate on the early years of his activities with Spain after he became
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TABLE 1
GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF HUTH’S CORRESPONDENTS IN SPAIN: A SAMPLE FOR 1812-1851
Location
No. of
correspondents Location
No. of
correspondents Location
No. of
correspondents Location
No. of
correspondents
Alcala 1 Castropol 2 Molina de Aragon 2 San Sebastian 22
Alcoy 1 Cordoba 1 Mondon˜edo 3 Santander 85
Algeciras 1 Corunna 113 Moreda 2 Santiago de
Compostela
29
Alicante 1 Cudillero 2 Mugardos 1 Santon˜a 1
Almazan 1 Cuenca 1 Muros 1 Segovia 2
Almeria 1 Estella 8 Ocan˜a 2 Seville 29
Amposta 1 Ferrol 5 Olaveaga 1 Soria 5
Aranda de
Duero
1 Gijon 30 Orense 10 Tarragona 3
Asturias 1 Gines 1 Oviedo 8 Tenerife 4
Avila 1 Guernica 2 Padron 1 Valencia 8
Barcelona 32 Jerez 5 Palencia 2 Vega de Rivadeo 1
Bejar 1 Llerena 1 Pamplona 12 Vigo 20
Betanzos 2 Logron˜o 1 Pontevedra 2 Villoslada de
Carneros
1
Bilbao 101 Luarca,
Asturias
1 Puerto Cesures 1 Vitoria 6
Burgos 7 Madrid 158 Puerto de Santa
Maria
2 Vivero 8
Caceres 3 Mahon 1 Puerto Real 1 Zaragoza 1
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TABLE 1 (Cont.)
Cadiz 59 Malaga 21 Reus 2 Zarauz 1
Candamo,
Asturias
1 Meira 1 Rivadeo 17 Grand total 870
Carril 2 Merida 1 Salamanca 1
Source: Huth Papers, Spanish and English Letters (HPEL, HPSL).
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established in London in 1809. This is followed by a description of a con-
solidated system of bilateral trades between Spain and Britain, and the positive
consequences of being connected to the Spanish monarchy. I then examine the
trade in Spanish mercury, before analysing the support given by Huth to trades
between Spain and non-British ports. Finally, the last section is devoted to
financial and other services provided by Huth to Spanish entrepreneurs.
HAMBURG AND CORUNNA: THE BEGINNINGS
Nowadays Huth is recognised as a leading London merchant banker. Yet,
his commercial origins can be traced to Hamburg and Spain. Frederick Huth,
the founder of Huth & Co., was born in Hanover in 1777 (Jones 2004, pp. 1-3)
and in 1791 he was admitted as an apprentice to a Basque merchant house in
Hamburg called Brentano Urbieta & Co. This was not unusual at that time since
many Basque merchants established themselves in European Atlantic ports
during the 1790s (Angulo-Morales 2011). Hamburg was by this time one of the
primary ports in continental Europe, an important entrepot of colonial produce,
in particular with regard to the British and Spanish empires. Merchants in
Hamburg were well connected to the most important European entrepots of the
time. Furthermore, when in 1795 Amsterdam was taken by the French, Ham-
burg made further commercial gains from this situation. In addition, merchants
formerly working in Le Havre, Amsterdam and Antwerp emigrated to Ham-
burg, bringing with them vast networks of trade and their capital (Jones 1987,
pp. 36-37; Roberts 1992, pp. 14-15; Wake 1997, p. 10). In other words, Huth
could not have asked for a better port to start his education.
After four years working for these Basque merchants, Frederick Huth was
promoted to senior clerk, and two years later, Juan Antonio Urbieta (the
head of this house) decided that he was of better use in Corunna, where
they had a branch house (Murray 1970, introduction). The links between
Hamburg and Corunna were important on account of the re-export trade of
Spanish colonial produce, but also because of the re-export of Silesian linens
from Hamburg to Corunna, and from Galicia into the rest of Spain and even
Spanish America (Jones 1987, p. 37). The Corunna house was headed by a
brother of Juan Antonio, who increasingly left much of the running of the
house in Huth’s hands. In addition, his arrival at Corunna roughly coincided
with the end of the monopoly of Seville-Cadiz with Spanish America. This is
important because it was in Galicia that Huth became familiar with Ibero-
American trade. Indeed, he was sent to South America several times acting
as supercargo. During these trips he landed in Rio de Janeiro, Callao,
Valparaiso and Buenos Aires, gaining valuable experience for his future
operations from London. Overall, Huth’s appointment in Galicia is crucial to
understanding his later connections with Spain after moving to London in
1809. It gave Huth a first-mover advantage over potential competitors, as well
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as long-lasting friends who could be trusted at a time when one of the main
obstacles to international trade was the lack of trust. In turn, trust was
intimately linked with two other crucial elements in international trade:
credit and reputation (Casson 1998, p. 23; Lamikiz 2010, introduction).
Frederick’s commercial experience in Hamburg, Corunna and South
America convinced him that he was able to manage a business of his own
and indeed, despite having been appointed chief clerk of Urbieta’s Galician
branch, he decided in 1805 that it was time to open his own establishment
(Murray 1970, introduction; Jones 2004, pp. 2-3). Unfortunately for him, the
Napoleonic invasion of the Iberian Peninsula followed soon after, and Huth
decided to leave the country. He had already married a young Spanish lady
called Manuela Felipa Mayfren (Freedman 1968, pp. 12-13).
Thus, Huth and his wife moved to London with little capital and only a
few letters of introduction given by his friend, the merchant Juan Francisco
Barrie´. Huth also had some valuable London contacts, previously cultivated
while working for Brentano Urbieta. Among those who helped Huth in his
early days in London was Fermı´n de Tastet, a Spanish merchant resident in
London and a contact provided by the Urbietas1. Tastet helped Huth to settle
in England and provided him with many contacts in Spain beyond Galicia.
Furthermore, when Huth decided to take a partner on board in 1815, he
chose John Frederick Gruning, at that time working for Tastet. Given that
Gruning remained his principal partner until his death, the long-term influence
of both Tastet and Spain’s on Huth should be seen as critical. Another early
influential friend in London was Adalid, a merchant from Corunna by then also
resident in the English capital. Finally, Flores-Mendez also proved helpful to
Huth during his early years in London. All in all, it is clear that without the
Spanish connection Huth’s establishment in London and his subsequent
expansion would have been very difficult if not impossible.
TRADING WITH SPAIN FROM LONDON: THE EARLY YEARS
In London in 1809, Huth resumed business as a general commission
merchant, albeit under difficult trading conditions given the impact of the
Napoleonic Wars on European trades at a time when England’s main trading
partner was Europe. The first three years of Huth’s operations are not well
documented. Yet, we have a good source of information from 1812 onwards.
Table 2, for example, contains Huth’s worldwide correspondents for 1812-1813,
and it gives us a clear sense of his early activities. Trade with Spain was the
backbone of the business, while the English connection was obviously very
strong too. Overall, he relied heavily on the contacts previously made in Spain.
1 SP 46/147/47, Harrys vs. Tastet. Statement by Huth, 1819. On the activities of Spanish mer-
chants in London (see Lamikiz 2010, pp. 45-50, 146-150).
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Huth’s main contacts in Spain were located in Bilbao, Cadiz, Corunna,
Rivadeo, Santander, Santiago de Compostela and San Sebastian. Essentially,
Huth obtained consignments of a wide range of British products for their
friends. More importantly, however, and certainly a consequence of the
extensive involvement of Hamburg and Corunna in colonial products, Huth
also obtained consignments of non-British products. Indeed, around this
early time, Huth’s strongest support to trade from Britain to Spain was not in
British manufactures but in foreign produce. In the particular case of pepper
and other spices, Huth was very active in London public auctions, buying for
up to 45 «friends» in Spain around the early and mid-1810s2. For all these
operations Huth charged a small commission on invoices and sales of no
more than 2.5 per cent for exports to Spain, certainly a small fee given all the
savings on searching for information, agreeing prices and looking for trusted
TABLE 2
LOCATION OF HUTH’S CORRESPONDENTS, 1812-1813
Country No. of correspondents Share (%)
Argentina 6 5.3
Cuba 1 0.9
Uruguay 1 0.9
Latin America 8 7.1
Spain 58 51.3
England 37 32.7
France 2 1.8
Germany 1 0.9
Gibraltar 1 0.9
Latvia 1 0.9
Portugal 1 0.9
Russia 1 0.9
Rest of Europe 7 6.2
Philippines 1 0.9
No available 2 1.8
Total 113 100
Source: Huth Papers Spanish Letters (HPSL).
2 HPIL, R/38, Account Current, 1817.
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buyers or sellers. In exchange for exports to Spain, Huth received consign-
ments of wool, and many other Spanish products. Spanish wool, however,
occupied most of Huth’s energies. Huth’s correspondents in Spain linked to
this trade consigned the wool to London or Bristol. If sent to Bristol, Hill &
Sons and Greaves & Son received and sold the wool on Huth’s behalf3.
During this early period, Huth operated mainly under consignments,
that is, getting Spanish colonial produce on consignment and encouraging
British suppliers to consign their merchandise to Huth’s contacts in Spain.
Thus Huth mainly acted as an intermediary between sellers and buyers. Why
did Spanish buyers not engage directly with British sellers, or British buyers
with Spanish sellers? The main reason for this was the high transaction costs
involved. The main obstacles to trade between Spain and Britain before
1850, as between so many markets at the time, were the lack of direct con-
tact, trust, product specification, agreement on prices and the language
barrier (Chapman 1992, p. 25; Casson 1998, p. 23; Jones 1998, p. 17). Thus,
the main transaction cost components of these obstacles were the search for
information, sampling of products, price setting and monitoring of quantity,
quality and punctuality in delivery.
However, because Huth had operated in Spain and Britain, and because
the company had so many sources of information for both markets, Huth
mastered both the British and the Spanish markets as very few competitors
did. We must be aware that London merchant banks not only handled flows
of goods and securities; they also handled large amounts of information
(Casson 1998, pp. 34-35). Because Huth was trusted by merchants at both
ends of the market chain, Huth was in a better position than most compe-
titors to reduce transaction costs and thus provide the necessary means of
linking buyers and sellers who could not otherwise trade easily among
themselves. It was too costly, for instance, for a Spanish wool exporter to find
a buyer in Britain and to agree on a selling price; he preferred to use trading
companies based in Britain, including merchant bankers such as Huth, as
«market-making» intermediaries (Casson 1998, pp. 22-24; Jones 2000,
pp. 27-28). Likewise, if a merchant in Spain (e.g. Ybarra) wanted to be
the bridge between British consigners and Spanish consignees, then this
merchant would need either to open a branch in London (at a significant
incremental cost) or to pay a commission to a broker in London, which was
probably the same commission Huth charged their Spanish clients so that it
made little sense to become involved in that kind of transaction.
Likewise, when a seller was consigning to a foreign market in the period
between the 1810s and the 1840s, he usually needed credit, which was pro-
vided by merchant banks. Indeed, the provision of credit was an intrinsic
part of the activities of any international merchant during this period, and
Huth (like so many London merchant bankers) was quick to enter this
3 HPSL-154, Huth to Hill & Sons (Bristol). London, April 8 and September 29, 1812.
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market. For example, his Spanish contacts would draw against Huth for
exports from Spain. Without these advances most Spanish consignments
would not have been possible since Spanish exporters usually lacked working
capital, which was abundant in a financial centre such as London, a point
further developed below. In any case, such was the importance of advances
that the acceptance business became the most important way of financing
world trade during the 19th century (Jones 2000, p. 23). Indeed, a leading
merchant bank would deal with hundreds of clients whose international
trade it supported, effectively acting as private bankers to many of their
clients (Chapman 1984, p. 115).
Finally, because ports in the south of England were well connected to the
north of Spain where most of Huth’s correspondents resided, it made sense
to have agents there. In Plymouth, for instance, Huth was assisted by James
Olver, who provided ships’ information, forwarded letters and handled
returns received from Spain. Likewise, in Portsmouth, Day & Phillips pro-
vided similar services. Finally, Huth’s confidential agents in Falmouth were
G. C. & R. W. Fox, all of whom were vital to the promotion of their Spanish
dealings. This is important because any potential Spanish competitor based
in Spain wanting to «steal» some of Huth’s clients would surely need to pay
agency fees in many of these southern English ports, which undoubtedly was
a major obstacle to overcome when competing with Huth.
CONSOLIDATING BILATERAL TRADES WITH SPAIN: A MATURE
BUSINESS
In 1812 Huth had fewer than 60 business correspondents in Spain. By
1822 this figure had trebled, and around the mid-1830s quadrupled in rela-
tion to 1812. I am not aware of any other London merchant banker having so
many connections in Spain at this early stage. Most prominent merchant
banks of the period concentrated on Anglo-American trades or on one or two
other markets (Chapman 1984, p. 38), among which Spain was not always a
preferred option. Such was the case, for example, of Baring Brothers
(Chapman 1984, pp. 26-27; Austin 2007, pp. 65-67)4, Brown Shipley & Co.
(Perkins 1975, pp. 17, 112-113; Chapman 1992, p. 152), Swire & Co.5,
Cropper & Benson6, and Rathbone Brothers & Co., all of which remained
highly focussed on the United States. Likewise, before 1850 other compar-
able London multinational traders specialised in European markets, but
these were beyond the reach of Spain. Such was the case of Brandt Sons &
4 It was only during the 1870s that Barings focussed their attention on other areas beyond the
United States and the Far East.
5 It was only during the second half of the century that the business expanded (Jones 2000,
p. 37; Jones 1987, pp. 145-146).
6 The core of their business was Anglo-American trade and finance (Wake 1997, pp. 39-40, 42-45).
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Co. (Chapman 1984, p. 122), and Ralli Brothers (Roberts 1992, p. 53;
Kynaston 1995, p. 56; Jones 2000, pp. 24-25).
Huth’s vast number of correspondents in Spain is a clear indication of the
consolidation of Huth’s British trades with Spain. As part of this process of
consolidating their position in Spain, it is worth noting that Huth’s involvement
in the Spanish wool market remained strong during most of the period covered
by this article. Yet, there was also a process of product diversification. Apart
from wool, another Spanish product, which became very important for Huth’s
dealings was wine, in particular the Jerez variety, which was at that time one of
the main Spanish exports, especially to Great Britain (Prados de la Escosura
1982b, pp. 208-210). Their main contact in Spain for this product was Haurie &
Nephews, of Xerez, an important local dealer in this commodity. Thus, Huth
received in London vast quantities of Jerez, which were redistributed to other
locations around Britain. Huth, however, also instructed Haurie to send the
wine directly to places such as Liverpool, Dublin and Bristol, where Huth
had either a branch or confidential agents who took care of the subsequent
redistribution of the wine to other locations7.
Regarding Huth’s strategy of product diversification, their networks
within Britain expanded substantially between the 1810s and the 1840s, in
particular the textile connections. Thus, apart from trading extensively in
wool, wine, pepper, other spices, Indian cottons, tallow, hides, cinnamon,
tobacco, rice, cod, rum and sugar, Huth had now become a major player in
the British textile export trade, sending vast supplies to Latin America, North
America, continental Europe and Asia. In turn, textiles were the main import
of Spain and Britain the most important supplier (Prados de la Escosura 1982b,
pp. 215-217). A logical consequence of this process was that Huth’s textile
exports to Spain also increased significantly during this period, as well as the
number of clients in Spain. Apart from British textiles, Huth also started to send
vast quantities of other British products to Spain, such as iron and coal, which
were also falling within Huth’s expertise in international trade.
Interestingly, this product diversification was unique for a London mer-
chant banker during the 1810s-1840s (Llorca-Jan˜a 2013). The usual pattern
for multinational merchants and merchant bankers during this early period
was to specialise in one or a few commodities only (Chapman 1984, p. 8). For
example, according to Chapman, prominent merchant banks of the period
such as Baring Brothers and Rothschild «focused on two or three sectors
or world trade in which they had come to specialise» (Chapman 1984,
pp. 35-36). Likewise, during the first half of the 19th century Schroders’ main
areas of trade were grain, raw cotton and sugar (Roberts 1992, chapter 1),
while Ralli Brothers specialised in textiles and grains (Jones 2000, pp. 24-25).
Finally, the House of Brown focussed mainly on the raw cotton trade
(Perkins 1975, pp. 17, 112-113).
7 HPEL-17, Huth to Haurie (Xerez). London, January 2 and 5, 1837.
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This partly explains why so many Spanish importers receiving consign-
ments from Britain preferred to use the services of Huth rather than mer-
chants based in Spain. We do not know what sort of commissions a
merchant in Spain would need to charge in order to obtain consignments
from London of many British or colonial products for other Spanish mer-
chants also resident in Spain, but we do know that Huth’s 2.5 per cent
commission was very low. We also know that if a Spanish merchant based in
Spain wanted to compete with Huth, then that merchant needed the same
level of expertise with regard to the products and would probably need either
a branch in Britain or to pay a confidential agent there, which would surely
increase his costs well above those charged by Huth.
Indeed, even the mighty Ybarra & Co. used the intermediary services of
Huth to purchase products in Britain8. Furthermore, Huth had a sound
knowledge of most products widely traded between Britain and Spain, which
a merchant based in Spain would certainly find very difficult to match. Huth
also had a good reputation in London, having survived all the financial
crises affecting merchant bankers during c. 1810-1850, so that those British
consigning to Spain preferred to do so through Huth (and other British
merchants) rather than through an unknown and untested Spanish merchant.
Finally, the British legal framework, which applied to those consigning through
London merchant houses was certainly preferred by British consigners over the
Spanish legal framework when things went wrong.
HUTH’S CONNECTIONS WITH THE SPANISH MONARCHY
Frederick Huth’s marriage had important consequences for his future
commercial dealings with Spain. Indeed, Manuela, his wife, was well
connected with the Spanish monarchy because of the fact that her father
was a senior member of the Spanish King’s court, and after her father’s
death she was taken under the care of the influential Duke of Veragua
(Jones 2004, pp. 1-3). Thanks to these connections, Manuela became
closely acquainted with the Princess of Asturias (Maria Antonia) (Murray
1970, pp. 72, 77). When Huth left Spain for Britain in 1809 he and his
wife took with them jewels belonging to Ferdinand and Maria Antonia for
safe keeping, as Maria Antonia had feared before her death that they
could be lost, given the political instability in Spain during the Napoleonic
Wars. The jewels were returned by Huth in person once Ferdinand was
restored and Maria Antonia had already passed away (Murray 1970,
pp. 77-78, 108).
But Maria Antonia’s early death was not the end of Frederick Huth’s
connections with the monarchy. He was also on good terms with the Spanish
8 HPIL, R48, Ybarra to Huth (Liverpool). Bilbao, November 27, 1839.
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Queen Maria Christina. Indeed, in 1829 he was appointed the Queen’s
financial adviser and private banker in Britain. Furthermore, after her hus-
band’s death in 1833, Maria Christina continued to rely on Huth for private
financial operations in London. That same year she secretly married
Fernando Agustı´n Mun˜oz, who happened to be the son of one of Huth’s earliest
contacts in Spain. Indeed, during the Carlist Wars, Maria Christina regularly
channelled private funds to London via Huth to invest them in British and
American securities. The nature of these operations should not surprise us given
the high level of corruption in Spain at that time (Lo´pez-Morell 2005, p. 89). The
key men behind these operations were Fernando Mun˜oz, Funez y Carrillo and
Manuel de Gaviria. It is worth mentioning that the latter had been a very close
friend of Ferdinand VII and his widow. Indeed, in 1833, when he was already
the quartermaster of the Casa Real, he was also entrusted with the royal family’s
treasury (Lo´pez-Morell 2005, p. 89).
By purchasing American securities, Spanish investors (including the
crown) were looking for the high returns provided by the new American
states. It is well known that during the first decades of the 19th century
American securities were widely introduced into Europe by institutions such
as the Bank of the United States in association with London merchant
bankers such as Peabody and Huth (McGrane 1935, pp. 8-9; Chapman 1984,
pp. 46-47; Kynaston 1995, pp. 116-117). As part of this process, in 1836 Huth
sold British consols belonging to Funez y Carrillo, which fetched over
£300,000 on the London market. This sum was 250 per cent of Huth’s capital
at that time so represented a sizeable sum of money, and it eventually
ensured Huth’s entre´e into the American securities market. Indeed, after
completing this operation, Funez y Carrillo asked Huth to invest part of these
funds in American securities. After assessing several options, Huth decided
to invest most of the Spaniards’ money with the infamous Bank of the United
States in the middle of the 1836-1837 crisis. This decision was taken fol-
lowing the recommendation of one of Huth’s agents (Perit of Philadelphia).
Despite the ongoing crisis, the Bank of the United States was still seen by
Perit as a reputable institution. The operation involved a £200,000 loan from
Huth (using Funez y Carrillo’s funds) to the Bank at an annual interest rate of
5 per cent and with the entire capital to be reimbursed ten years later. The
Bank was also to pay a commission, which was distributed between Funez y
Carillo, Huth and Perit9. In addition, £25,000 was invested by Funez y Carillo
in Morris Canal & Banking’s bonds.
Furthermore, a few years later in 1839, Huth bought more American
securities for their Spanish clients. This time the chosen instruments were
state bonds of the Union Bank of Mississippi, worth over £120,000. Among
the final buyers were Gaviria (£79,000), Funez y Carrillo (£42,000) and a
9 HPEL-17, Huth to Perit (Philadelphia). London, April 29, 1837; HPJ 1836 and HPJ 1837
(unnumbered pages) and HPL-F.
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lesser-known Spanish investor called Miguel Alava10. In addition, Gaviria
acquired Alabama bonds for some £44,000 and Arkansas bonds for another
£60,000. Regarding these operations, it is believed that Gaviria and Funez y
Carrillo subsequently transferred these bonds to Fernando Mun˜oz, who had
secretly married Maria Christina, and that in turn Mun˜oz was actually
buying on behalf of the Spanish Queen (Freedman 1968, p. 343).
At this stage the reader may wonder why Spanish investors needed Huth’s
services to buy American securities or why American sellers needed London
merchant banks as intermediaries to sell their securities on the Spanish
market. The answer is clear: transaction costs were too high, in particular
because of the lack of trust and information. In intermediating financial
flows, a merchant banker used the same principles as used when inter-
mediating commodity flows, procuring funds from an investor «with whom
it has built up a reputation for sound judgement» (Casson 1998, pp. 37-38).
In our case, if a Spanish investor wanted to invest in American securities, he
needed to have good information about the securities being offered at that
time on the market. Few Spaniards could have had a good working knowl-
edge of the American market during this early period, while, in contrast,
Huth enjoyed an extremely close financial connection with the United States.
That is, most potential Spanish competitors were excluded from this profit-
able business because American states and companies preferred to use the
services of trustworthy London merchant banks, widely known not only in
the United States and Britain but also in many the parts of continental
Europe where United States securities ended up.
Indeed, from the mid-1830s Huth was very active floating United
States securities on the European market (McGrane 1935, p. 9; Jenks 1963,
chapter 3), at a time when not even Baring Brothers or Rothschild partici-
pated in this market11. By this stage Huth had two important confidential
agents in the United States: Goodhue & Co. of New York and the afore-
mentioned Perit of Philadelphia. They both provided invaluable information
for Huth, who trusted them; this fact was known to his friends in Spain who, in
turn, fully trusted Huth. That is, trust and information were readily and cheaply
provided by Huth, in particular if compared with other alternatives available in
Spain. From the American sellers’ point of view, they needed a reputable house
to offer their securities (otherwise no one would buy them) and Huth’s repu-
tation was beyond discussion (Chapman 1984, p. 72). This is important because
before the transport and communications revolution of the second half of the
19th century «a good reputation, built on past behaviour, was often the only
reliable antidote to the effects of distrust» (Lamikiz 2010, p. 10).
As a result, the commission Huth charged Spanish investors on the
purchase of American securities was very low. If a Spanish merchant banker
10 HPJ, 1839, several dates.
11 Barings and Rothschild did not enter this market until 1852 (Chapman 1984, p. 92).
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wanted to compete with London merchant banks in this market he would
need high-quality confidential agents in the United States, as Huth had in
both Goodhue and Perit, to whom a commission also had to be paid. This of
course was not easy to achieve and certainly did not come cheap. Further-
more, the Spanish merchant banker needed to be trusted by US states
wanting to float their debt in Europe, so that they would need to be perceived
as reputable and attractive not only to Spanish investors but also to other
European investors beyond Spain. However, an international reputation was
not easily achieved and Spanish merchant bankers of the time did not often
deal directly with the United States so were little known there.
Yet, despite Huth’s credentials, the Bank of the United States suspended
specie payments in 1839 and eventually closed its doors in February 1841
and passed into liquidation (Kynaston 1995, pp. 116-117). Likewise, in 1840
the Morris Canal & Banking failed to provide dividends and subsequently
also collapsed. In addition, in 1841 the Union Bank of Mississippi failed to
pay dividends on its bonds, and the legislature of that state later repudiated
its bonds altogether. Other states (including Arkansas) also failed to pay
dividends on their debts because of lack of funds. Not surprisingly, American
securities had a very bad reputation in Europe and few transactions took
place on the London market. As a consequence, Huth’s Spanish clients saw
an important part of their investments heavily compromised. This was per-
haps the worst error of judgement Frederick Huth ever made. He advised his
Spanish friends badly and public opinion punished merchant bankers for
recommending their clients to invest in risky and uncertain ventures. After
all, Huth, like many other intermediaries disposing of securities, did not lose
any money; he lost his clients’ money. The Times in particular launched a
ferocious attack on merchant bankers, which no doubt was applauded in
Madrid. The Times even called for an enquiry
into the manner in which they [USA securities] first obtained circu-
lation here; into the conduct of the mercantile or banking firms who
first introduced them, more especially as regards the preliminary
investigation by which they satisfied themselves of the resources and
the means of credit of the borrowing states, which induced them to
offer shares in the loans to their friendsy It is hoped, therefore, that
something may be done in the matter, particularly as it has been
insinuated that enormous commissions y have been allowed to
mercantile firms for assistance in getting this rubbish into circulation
and defraudingy innocent holders12.
Among these «innocent holders» Spanish investors were doubtless first on
the list.
12 The Times, April 14, 1842, ‘Money-Market and City Intelligence’.
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For several years Huth’s Spanish clients did not see a single penny from
their investments in the Morris Canal, the Union Bank of Mississippi and the
Bank of the United States. Such was Funez’s anguish (and surely the
Queen’s), that in the early 1840s he moved to the United States to try to
recover part of his capital13. Painful negotiations followed, but the Spanish
investors only recovered a small part of their money14. The Spaniards’ most
important concern was undoubtedly the £200,000 invested in the Bank of the
United States. Thomas Dunlap, a former president of the bank, was assigned
to recover the due monies. In addition, Leon Lillo (financial adviser to the
Queen of Spain in Paris) was also sent to support Dunlap’s efforts. However,
even after the bonds matured in 1847, it proved very difficult to recover
anything at all. At one moment it was even suggested that in order to recover
the Union Bank of Mississippi’s bonds one strategy would be to disclose that
«the Queen of Spain was the owner of a large amount of bonds represented
by Huth y [and] that a foreign royal personage could sue a state in the
United States Supreme Court» (McGrane 1935, p. 216), although this idea
was eventually disregarded.
In any case, Huth’s bad advice to Spanish investors did not seem to have
affected his reputation in Spain, not even within the Spanish Royalty. Indeed, in
1847 he was made Knight Commander of the Order of Charles III15. Likewise,
Huth was appointed as Paymaster Abroad for the Spanish state, that is, the firm
was in charge of paying Spanish consular agents and diplomats worldwide. By
having so many correspondents all over the world, Huth was in an ideal position
to accomplish the task entrusted by the Spanish Crown. No other London
merchant banker of his time had diversified geographically as Huth did before
1850, let alone a Spanish merchant banker. Indeed, around 1847 Huth had over
1,800 correspondents in all continents, as seen in Table 3. All the company had
to do was to instruct Spanish diplomats and consuls abroad to present their
salaries’ receipts to one of its nominated connections in the location where that
consul resided.
Finally, Huth’s connections with Spanish authorities spread further
afield. For a while the firm was well connected to Jose Safont, who was one
of the agents of the contractors to the Spanish government procuring tobacco
for the country. Thus, for example, Huth arranged a deal between Clason & Ules
of New Orleans and Safont, for the former to supply tobacco to the latter. For
these operations, Huth granted a substantial credit of £60,000, for which the
bank reserved its rights to charge a small commission16. All in all, Huth’s
connections with the Spanish royalty were surprisingly diverse. For example,
13 HPSL-175, Huth to Funez (New Orleans). London, January 8, 1843; HPIL, S/SP/2, Funez to
Huth. Philadelphia, September 27, 1844; HPEL-46, Huth to Funez. London, June 3, 1845.
14 Business correspondence in the Huth papers ends abruptly in 1852. After this year, little is
known about what Spanish investors recovered.
15 Previously, Huth had been appointed a Knight of the Order of Charles III of Spain.
16 HPEL-53, Huth to Clason & Ules (New Orleans). London, June 18, 1847.
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TABLE 3
LOCATION OF HUTH’S CORRESPONDENTS. A SAMPLE FOR 1846-1848
Country No. of correspondents Share (%) Country No. of correspondents Share (%)
North America 77 4.2 United Kingdom 324 17.5
Mexico 27 1.5 England 278 15.0
United States 50 2.7 Northern Ireland 8 0.4
Scotland 26 1.4
Caribbean 60 3.2 Wales 12 0.6
Cuba 44 2.4
Haiti 1 0.1 Europe 1,216 65.7
Jamaica 2 0.1 Austria 19 1.0
Puerto Rico 6 0.3 Belgium 73 3.9
Saint Thomas 3 0.2 Croatia 1 0.1
Saint Croix 4 0.2 Czech Republic 6 0.3
Denmark 5 0.3
South America 63 3.4 Finland 5 0.3
Argentina 7 0.4 France 73 3.9
Bolivia 1 0.1 Germany 528 28.5
Brazil 22 1.2 Gibraltar 1 0.1
Chile 6 0.3 Ireland 4 0.2
Colombia 1 0.1 Italy 19 1.0
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TABLE 3 (Cont.)
Country No. of correspondents Share (%) Country No. of correspondents Share (%)
Guyana 1 0.1 Latvia 5 0.3
Peru 10 0.5 Netherlands 61 3.3
Uruguay 2 0.1 Norway 7 0.4
Venezuela 13 0.7 Poland 38 2.1
Portugal 4 0.2
Asia 60 3.2 Russia 11 0.6
China 12 0.6 Spain 226 12.2
India 40 2.2 Sweden 88 4.8
Philippines 4 0.2 Switzerland 40 2.2
Singapore 1 0.1 Ukraine 2 0.1
Sri Lanka 1 0.1
Turkey 2 0.1 No available 39 2.1
Africa 5 0.3 Australia 6 0.3
Sierra Leone 1 0.1
South Africa 4 0.2 Grand total 1,850 100
Source: Huth Papers, Spanish Letters (HPSL), English Letters (HPEL) and German Letters (HPGL): HPSL-177; HPSL-178; HPEL-49; HPEL-50; HPGL-
122; HPGL-123.
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the firm also participated indirectly in a Spanish government monopoly (i.e.
quicksilver), as is described in the following section.
SPANISH QUICKSILVER
Apart from Spanish wool, wine, and other products, Huth was also very
interested in Spanish quicksilver, an essential input for the production of
silver in the world, the supply of which, during our period of study (before
the Californian discoveries), was mainly restricted to Spain (Almade´n and
Almadenejos mines), and to a lesser extent to Peru (Huancavelica) and Idria
(now Slovenia). Indeed, during the first decades of the 19th century quick-
silver became one of the emerging products within Spanish exports (Prados de
la Escosura 1982b, p. 183). Huth’s interest in this commodity began in the mid-
1810s, and it increased after the opening of the bank’s branches in Chile and
Peru during the 1820s, as both countries were important producers of silver17.
On the West Coast, Huth was one of the main merchant houses, and was well
connected with local merchants and authorities, including, for example, the
director of a silver mine. This situation, according to Huth, put them in a good
position to sell vast quantities of quicksilver on the Pacific18. Likewise, although
Huth did not have a branch in Mexico, it had a very important connection there:
the Drusinas, who were their confidential agents and who were also keen to
receive this product given Mexico’s paramount silver production.
Almade´n’s quicksilver production, however, was in the hands of the
Spanish Crown, so that it was very difficult to get any consignment of mer-
cury without good political connections in Madrid. Yet despite Huth’s close
links with the Spanish Crown, they could never secure much in the way of
supplies from Spain. Nonetheless, a first consignment of quicksilver was
obtained by one of Huth’s sons, after touring Spain in 182919. A connection
with Corral y Puente, who was well connected in Madrid and Seville in
relation to the mercury trade, proved particularly useful20. Such was Huth’s
interest in this product, that although by the late 1820s they were operating
mainly on consignments for most products, they were willing to operate on
own account for this particular commodity if Corral y Puente could secure a
deal with the Spanish government21. Nonetheless, Huth’s early endeavours to
get more consignments failed miserably22. Apparently, other «Spanish»
houses operating in London were better connected, and so were the mighty
Rothschild & Sons.
17 HPSL-160, Huth to Huth Jr (Cadiz). London, October 26, 1829.
18 HPSL-161, Huth to Huth Jr (Cadiz). London, January 1, 1830.
19 HPSL-161, Huth to Huth Jr (Cadiz). London, December 4, 1829.
20 HPSL-161, Huth to Huth Jr (Cadiz). London, January 1, 1830.
21 HPSL-161, Huth to Corral y Puente (Cadiz). London, December 4, 1829 and January 1, 1830.
22 HPSL-161, Huth to Corral y Puente (Cadiz). London, March 5, 1830
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Thereafter, the situation seemed to have worsened until 1830, when the
Spanish Crown decided to grant the production of Almade´n to a sole buyer.
The first contract was given to In˜igo Ezpeleta of Bordeaux and had a dura-
tion of five years, and in 1835 it passed to Rothschild & Sons (Prados de la
Esocura 1982b, pp. 205-206; Lo´pez-Morell 2005, p. 65; Platt 2011, p. 38). This
near monopoly-monopsony left Huth with few options of trading directly in
this product. Instead, the firm now resorted to getting consignments from the
Rothschilds. From c. 1836 Huth became Rothschild’s agent in Chile and Peru.
Likewise, Huth’s agents in Mexico were entrusted to sell Rothschild’s quicksilver
(Platt 2011, p. 41, 2012, p. 213). Although it was true that Huth depended on
the Rothschilds to obtain consignments, it was also the case that without Huth’s
services or those of a similar house in either Chile, Peru or Mexico, the
Rothschilds would not have been able to do much business without running
major risks, as one of their agents touring Latin America reported: «Having only
been here so short a time I cannot yet state whether I shall be able to take
charge of the quicksilver at first without the intervention of eithery Huth or
some other house. I think however from the manner in which business is
conducted here in general that I shall not be able to do so»23. And indeed, in
order to sell Rothschild’s quicksilver in Latin America Huth charged a very high
commission of 13 per cent. Yet, because Rothschild did not have a branch in
either Chile, Peru or Mexico, they were forced to rely on Huth.
What is more, as well as receiving consignments from the Rothschilds,
Huth also bought from them on their own account, in particular sending
cargoes to Drusina24. Helping to develop this trade to Mexico was the fact
that Henry Huth, one of Frederick Huth’s sons, worked for the Drusinas for
several years, even becoming a partner25. Unfortunately, vast quantities of
quicksilver started to be produced in California from the late 1840s, and this
production reached not only Mexico but also Chile and Peru at lower prices
than the Rothschilds had been offering for over a decade. In California,
production was in the hands of Forbes, and their chosen agents in the Pacific
were one of Huth’s main competitors: Gibbs & Sons. Undoubtedly, this was a
great blow to Rothschild’s re-exports of Spanish quicksilver to the Americas,
and Huth’s interests in this trade, as the market price declined quickly26.
MOVING BEYOND BILATERAL TRADES: HELPING SPAIN TO TRADE
WITH THE WORLD
Huth, and in particular his global trading and financial networks,
expanded exponentially after the 1820s. By 1850 the bank had an accumulated
23 RHL, XI/38/81B, Davidson to Rothschild (London). Valparaiso, February 28, 1848.
24 RHL, XI/38/149/A, Huth to Rothschild (London). London, December 17, 1839.
25 HPEL-31, Huth to Drusina (Mexico). London, January 15, February 3 and 15, 1841.
26 RHL, XI/38/82/A, Davidson to Rothschild (London). San Francisco, August 31, 1851.
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list of over 6,000 correspondents all over the world, in more than 70 coun-
tries in the five continents (Llorca-Jan˜a 2013). Yet, despite this success,
Huth’s expansionary process was not exempt from difficulties. Trust was key
to building commercial networks during this period, but was only slowly and
painfully cultivated. For example, when he was establishing his London
branch, Frederick Huth once confessed that he was trying to get some cargoes
of cod from Newfoundland for Spain, but that no house wanted to enter into
business with him because he was unknown there27. Recommendations from
other merchants were fundamental to multiplying the network of contacts, and
he learnt how to use them effectively. For example, Brentano Urbieta gave Huth
many of their most valuable early contacts abroad, like Conrad Rucker of
Montevideo, to whom Huth started to consign Catalonian wine28.
Apart from his first masters, Frederick’s contacts in Spain also provided
many of his early connections in Latin America. For example, the Llano
family of Corunna had some relatives in the River Plate, to whom he was
quick to write after establishing a base in London, and he soon started
trading with Llano & Hermano of Buenos Aires29. Likewise, Serra of Corunna
was happy to provide the means of connecting Huth with Alsina of Buenos
Aires30, while the Sanchez family of Corunna also provided links to their branch
house in Buenos Aires. Finally, many of his early correspondents in Spain had
sister offices in many of the Spanish colonies. For example, the principal
partner of Pola Mendive of Havana (one of the main correspondents in Cuba)
was Menendez of Corunna, while Goicouria, also of Havana, was also a branch
of Goicouria e Hijos.
Although it is true that many of Huth’s earliest connections in Latin
America were in the main provided by Spanish merchants, Huth’s global
network stretching to over 70 countries was not solely because of contacts
made in Frederick’s early life in Spain. They were mainly a consequence of
his honesty, his ability to nurture friendships, and later on to his commercial
reputation. More importantly, Huth’s connections in Spain could now profit
from the firm’s connections all over the world. Indeed, Huth not only parti-
cipated actively in bilateral trades between Spain and Britain, but was also
happy to help supply Spanish merchant establishments in Spain, Spanish
colonies or former Spanish American colonies from beyond Britain. Upon
Huth’s intermediation and recommendation, Huth’s friends in continental
Europe, Asia and the Americas regularly supplied many of their «Spanish»
connections anywhere in the world. For example, glasses from Bohemia
were sent to Buenos Aires thanks to Huth’s intervention31. From Cuba,
27 HPSL-157, Huth to Viuda de Trueba (Corunna). London, August 30, 1815.
28 HPSL-159, Huth to Rucker (Montevideo). London, October 15, 1822.
29 HPSL-154, Huth to Llano (Buenos Aires). London, July 7, 1812.
30 HPSL-154, Huth to Alsina (Buenos Aires). London, July 7, 1812.
31 HPSL-156, Huth to Llano (Buenos Aires). London, November 5, 1814.
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Layseca of Havana coordinated shipments of sugar and tobacco to northern
Spain32. Likewise, Groning of Hamburg used to send German glasses reg-
ularly to Spain, to the likes of Rochelt Brothers (Bilbao), while Huffel of
Hamburg supplied Antonio Prado from Rivadeo with many German manu-
factures. Beyond Germany, cheese from Amsterdam was often sent by Van
Veen & Son to Rochelt Brothers of Bilbao and Adalid of Corunna.
In this vein, the Riga connection deserves a few lines. From the 1810s,
Huth was an instrumental player in the flax-fiber trade from Riga to Galicia
and Bilbao, at a time when this product ranked among the most important
raw materials imported by Spain (Prados de la Escosura 1982b, p. 184). This
trade became so important that Riga’s exports to Spain were one of the most
important trades connecting Huth and Spain. This flax fiber was used in
Galicia for the production of the famous Galician linens. From the 1810s,
Riga houses consigned vast cargoes to Huth’s contacts in Galicia and the
Basque country. Mitchell & Co. became their main connection in Riga, but
many other houses also became involved, with the volume of trade
increasing significantly and remaining high during the 1820s-1840s. By 1829,
for example, 12-15 cargoes of flax-fiber linked to Huth left yearly from Riga
for Spain33.
However, Spain’s exports to other destinations beyond Britain also
benefited from Huth’s global contacts. For example, wine was consigned by
Sierra & Hermanos (Santiago de Compostela) or Vilardaga (Barcelona) to
Huth’s connections in Buenos Aires34. Likewise, once Huth had opened
branch offices in both Peru and Chile, many of Huth connections in Spain
were happy to supply their establishments on the West Coast. For example,
Vilardaga & Reynals of Barcelona happily supplied wine to Callao and
Valparaiso upon Huth’s request.
Why did this Spanish dependence on the intermediation of Huth (and
other London merchant bankers) and their network of contacts exist? Why
were these Spanish merchants unable to trade directly with those foreign
merchants beyond Spain and Britain? Why did they not simply use the ser-
vices provided by merchant banks in Spain instead? This is a key theoretical
question concerning the existence of merchant banks and in general of
multinational trading companies (Jones 1998, pp. 16-17). In turn, the lack of
research on the functions performed by merchant banks may be a result of
neo-classical economic theory treating firms (including merchant banks) as
«black boxes» within a world in which there is no role for intermediaries
because of the assumed existence of perfect information and enforcement
(Jones 2000, p. 4). The first half of the 19th century, however, was quite
different from a neo-classical world. Indeed, Spanish merchants used Huth
32 HPSL-159, Huth to Layseca (Havana). London, July 30, 1822.
33 HPSL-160, Huth to Huth Jr (Cadiz). London, November 6, 1829.
34 HPSL-159, Huth to Dickson Montgomery (Buenos Aires). London, June 21, 1822.
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(and other British merchants) as intermediaries, rather than searching
directly for contracting partners, because international trade during this
period required trust and good information about the import and export
markets; trading internationally was risky. Chapman has already pointed to
the fact that when communications were slow and difficult «the ultimate
problem of the overseas merchant was maintaining understanding, policy
and trust with correspondents» (Chapman 1992, p. 45).
Huth’s unique global network and extensive product diversification
(Llorca-Jan˜a 2013) provided trust and information at a lower cost than could
be procured in Spain, thus reducing risks: Huth greatly decreased search,
negotiation and general transaction costs for Iberian businessmen. Huth
specialised in overcoming these obstacles to trade on behalf of his corre-
spondents in a world of informational asymmetries. Huth’s impressive global
network of contacts gave the firm at least a handful of trustable correspon-
dents in every major port in which any Spanish merchant wanted to trade.
This was known to Spanish merchants and they used Huth effectively.
Furthermore, there were also language and cultural barriers to overcome.
For example: if a Spanish merchant wanted German manufactures, how
would he contact a supplier in Germany? In which language should the
Spaniard write? In contrast, Huth was conversant with German, Spanish,
English, Portuguese, French and even Italian. More importantly, Frederick
Huth also knew hundreds of German manufacturers who trusted him, while he
in turn trusted hundreds of Spanish merchants requiring German manu-
factures. Consequently, acting as a bridge between buyers in Spain and sellers in
Germany (with previous payment of a commission) was relatively easy for Huth
while it was very difficult for a Spaniard to do so directly. But perhaps equally
importantly, these foreign trade operations required credit, and credit was
scarce and dear in Spain, as is explained in the following section.
FINANCIAL AND OTHER SERVICES PROVIDED BY HUTH TO
SPANISH MERCHANTS
The pivotal role played by non-banking institutions in supporting the
expansion of international trade before 1850 has long been recognised.
Merchant banks, in particular, played a crucial role by advancing monies to
consigners of products all over the world. Without this form of credit, many
international trade operations could not have taken place, in particular for
countries lacking capital, such as Spain. Overall, the increasingly complex
system of international trade that developed from the mid-18th century
depended largely on this provision of credit (Perkins 1975, pp. 8, 85-86;
Chapman 1984, chapter 7, 1992, p. 46; Roberts 1992, p. 27, 1993, p. 23; Jones
2000, p. 23). Indeed, after Huth became a merchant banker, the firm pro-
vided open credits and letters of credit to many of his Spanish connections,
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enabling them to trade with many parts of the world. The acceptance of bills
of exchange became so important that for most London merchant bankers of
the period accepting replaced trading as their main source of income (Jones
2000, p. 23). In turn, Huth was one of the leading accepting houses of the
period covered by this article, in particular for trades beyond the United
States (Chapman 1992, p. 70). It was only Huth’s international reputation,
however, which allowed the bank to become a leading acceptor, and indeed
only institutions with a sound reputation could enter the acceptance market
(Chapman 1984, pp. 70-71; Jones 2000, p. 23).
I have mentioned that one of the most important products traded between
Spain and Britain during the period covered by this article was Spanish raw
wool. To support this branch of trade, a great deal of credit was extended in
London to Spanish suppliers. This trade, in turn, was also one of the most
important branches of trade for Huth with Spain. Once the wool had arrived
in Bilbao, San Sebastian, Santander or any other Spanish port, the Spanish
wool suppliers were entitled to draw against Huth for a share of the value of
the cargo at 90 days (a practice known as advances)35. Likewise, Haurie’s
shipments of wine to Britain were also made possible thanks to Huth’s liberal
advances, as was the case with many other Spanish exports. Huth charged a
commission of just 1 per cent on the value of the drafts before accepting
them (although a higher rate could be applied in cases of clients of lower
standing or repute), but if the draft was not covered at maturity, then the
commission would increase to 2.5 per cent. Often too, if the merchant
enjoying an open «confirmed» credit with Huth did not use it, a commission
of 0.5 per cent could be charged anyway, and if subsequently the credit was
used, then the other 0.5 per cent was charged. In any case, the drafts could be
cashed at maturity or discounted immediately after acceptance. That is,
advances were money provided before sales had taken place or before
remittances had been received. If the drafts were cashed after acceptance,
the usual discount rate (given Huth’s solid reputation) was very close to that
of the Bank of England. These liberal credit facilities were not available in
Spain to merchants exporting to Britain because Spanish enterprises were
less creditworthy for bills payable in London. Likewise, the distinguishing
feature of London merchant bankers of the period was a large capital linked
with intimate knowledge of a particular market (Chapman 1992, p. 70).
In Huth’s case, the firm was unrivalled in Spain.
Furthermore, Huth also extended liberal credit to British exporters to
Spain. A British textile manufacturer in, say, Manchester, would draw
against Huth for the shipment of cottons to one of their correspondents in,
say, Galicia, and then probably discount the bill immediately after accep-
tance. Thus the British manufacturer benefited because he was less exposed
to the risk of selling directly to a foreign market (Chapman 1992, pp. 68-71).
35 HPSL-160, Huth to Huth Jr (Cadiz). London, October 9, 1829.
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Huth would accept the draft because he trusted both the British exporter and
the Spanish importer. In turn, the Mancunian exporter would not draw a bill
against a merchant in Galicia (or in Madrid) because it was probably not dis-
countable in either Britain or Spain, and certainly not payable in sterling as the
Mancunian would have wanted. That is, a merchant banker resident in Spain
would not be able to offer the same services offered by London merchant
bankers because he would have been unknown to the British manufacturer.
Huth’s advances, however, were extended to support many other trades
linked to Spain and her colonies, even those which went nowhere near London.
These included trades: (i) between Spain and her colonies; (ii) between former
Spanish colonies and Spain; (iii) between Spanish colonies and former Spanish
colonies; and (iv) between Spanish colonies and other markets beyond the
Americas. For example, regarding the first case, sugar was sent from Cuba to
Corunna, Cadiz and other Spanish ports thanks to liberal advances given by
Huth to merchants in Cuba. Likewise, shipments of sugar from Manila to Spain
received advances from Huth in London. Regarding the second case, cacao
shipments sent from Venezuela to Santander or to other Spanish ports received
advances from Huth. In particular, Bermudez of Caracas would draw against
Huth for cargoes sent to Porrua Egusquiza of Santander, with drafts at 90-120
days, which had to be covered by Porrua Egusquiza at maturity. Finally, cargoes
of hides from Buenos Aires to Spain also received Huth’s generous advances.
Regarding the third case, extensive shipments of jerked beef from the
River Plate to Havana received advances from Huth in London. Cuban sugar
was also shipped to Chile and Peru using Huth’s credit. Finally, in the fourth
case, Huth also funded trade operations between Spanish colonies and other
markets beyond Spain or the Americas such as continental Europe. For
example, Embil of Havana was in the habit of sending sugar cargoes to Antwerp
and St Petersburg funded by Huth’s advances, and so did Mariategui and Drake,
while Pastor of Havana consigned tobacco to Gaedechens of Hamburg after
drawing bills of exchange against Huth as advances. To support these opera-
tions, Huth would open a credit account to the importer in, say, St. Petersburg
in favour of the consigner in, say, Havana, and the latter would draw against
Huth to settle his account with the consignee.
Perhaps more importantly, most of the strategic Riga flax-fiber trade was
made possible thanks to Huth’s credit. In this case the firm’s agents in Riga
would buy flax, ship it to Spain and draw against Huth. In London Huth
would immediately accept these drafts. That is, indirectly Huth was
extending credit to the Spanish merchants in Galicia receiving the flax-fiber.
For example, Stresow & Sons and Jacobs & Co. would buy in Riga for
Bengoechea (Rivadeo) or for Garcia in Santiago de Compostela. Before
shipping the products they would draw against Huth on account of this flax,
usually for up to two-thirds of the invoice value of the cargoes. Finally, the
Spanish merchant receiving the flax would pay back to Huth the monies lent
by Huth to the Riga merchants, ideally covering the drafts before maturity.
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At this point an obvious question arises. Why were Spanish merchant
bankers not able to offer the same credit services as those provided so
extensively by merchant bankers in London? Or, alternatively, why did
Spanish traders prefer Huth’s credit to Spain’s own credit facilities during
the period covered by this article? We must remember that during the 1810s-
1840s Britain was the world’s largest trading nation as well as the largest
capital exporter. Consequently, a great deal of the finance of world trade
«was orchestrated in London and sterling was the main currency of inter-
national finance» (Chapman 1992, pp. 4-5, 41-42; Jones 2000, pp. 2-3, 19-20).
London had already overtaken Amsterdam as the premier centre of inter-
national finance and payments (Chapman 1984, p. 9). Therefore, London
merchant bankers’ credit facilities were unmatched by financers in Spain
because capital was more expensive in Spain.
We also know that during most of the 18th century and the first half of the
19th century, overseas trade within Europe and beyond was an elite activity
because of the large amount of capital required to operate in this sector
(Chapman 1992, pp. 27-28). Not only was ample capital needed, but also a
sound international reputation. And indeed, on account of these two lim-
itations, London merchant bankers during the 1810s-1840s consisted of a
very small group of some 15 businessmen. Many of the merchant bankers’
advantages can certainly be explained by reputational asymmetries in
international business (Jones 2000, p. 6). In this respect, Huth’s capital and
international reputation would have been difficult to match by a merchant
banker resident in Spain.
Moving beyond the provision of credit, it is known that another of the
many roles performed by a London merchant bank during the first half of the
19th century was dealing in bills of exchange, an activity which did not
escape Huth’s enthusiasm. In order to fulfil this role, the firm obtained
acceptance in London for bills of exchange drawn anywhere in the world if they
were drawn on a London house. If drawn in a currency different to sterling,
Huth also negotiated exchange rates on behalf of their correspondents,
including many Iberian establishments. Among Huth’s principal Spanish cus-
tomers were the Banco Espan˜ol de San Fernando (predecessor of the Bank of
Spain)36, whose director was none other than Joaquin de Fagoaga.
Furthermore, in 1844 Huth secured another important Spanish deal in
bills of exchange after being appointed by the Banco de Isabel II as their
representative on the London market. For a 0.25 per cent commission, Huth
would get acceptance and negotiate exchange rates on this bank’s behalf37.
Unfortunately this bank only lasted a few years and disappeared during the
financial crisis of 1847. Another of Huth’s important clients was the Banco de
Cadiz. Again, as for many other contacts in Spain, Huth obtained acceptance
36 HPSL-177, Huth to Banco de San Fernando, any letter for this volume.
37 HPSL-176, Huth to Banco de Isabel II. London, May 14 and 16, 1844.
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of bills in London, negotiated exchange rates, collected London bills
endorsed in the Banco de Cadiz’s favour, and credited them into this bank’s
account38. Finally, it hardly needs pointing out that Huth’s connections in
Spain also performed in return the same services he carried out for them in
London for bills of exchange drawn on Spain. For example, Serra Hermanos
of Barcelona were entrusted to get acceptance in Catalonia for any bill of
exchange drawn in Huth’s favour.
Why did these Spanish banks need the financial intermediation of Lon-
don merchant bankers? The answer is similar to the argument provided
before: to obtain acceptance of bills in Britain on behalf of Spanish mer-
chants Huth had a headquarters in London, a branch in Liverpool, con-
fidential agents in many other British locations, dozens of experienced clerks
(many of them specialists in Spain) and a sound reputation, which helped the
bank to represent its Spanish friends against British banking institutions.
Likewise, in negotiating exchanges between London and Madrid, Huth’s
expertise in both markets was unmatched by most competitors in either
Spain or Britain, so that their friends in Spain could use Huth’s information
at a low rate.
The connections between Huth and Spanish businessmen take us again to
the securities market. Two other important facts should be highlighted at
this point. First, not only was the Spanish Crown interested in buying
securities via Huth on the London market, many more Spanish businessmen
resorted to their services to buy securities in the English capital. This usually
included British and US securities, but there was also an interest in Spanish
securities themselves, which were widely traded in London. For example, in
the «Spanish panic» of May 1835, Spanish securities lost 30 per cent of their
value on the London market, bringing ruin to many investors. Thereafter,
many Spanish securities were also liquidated on British soil by Huth on
behalf of Spanish businessmen. For example, Yribarren & Sobrinos often
asked Huth to sell shares of the «empre´stito nacional» on their behalf.
Likewise, Gaviria was also in the habit of requesting Huth to liquidate
«tı´tulos espan˜oles» and «cupones» in London39, many of which either
belonged to the royal family or to Gaviria himself, given his proclivity to mix
government with private business (Lo´pez-Morell 2005, p. 88). This is not
surprising: after the restoration of Ferdinand VII, Spain’s debt was issued in
both France and Britain by eminent bankers, and therefore «Spanish» bonds
were widely traded in both London and Paris.
Beyond the financial sector, Huth was also happy to provide any other
reasonable service upon request. For example, in 1828 Spain imposed a very
high import duty on lino coming from Riga if shipped in foreign vessels. By
contrast, if imported in Spanish vessels the duty was reduced by around
38 HPSL-180, Huth to Banco de Cadiz. London, February 8, 1851.
39 HPSL-175, Huth to Gaviria (Madrid). London, January 1, 1843.
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50 per cent. Likewise, around this time, exports of flour from Spain to
Havana in foreign vessels also had to pay very high import duties in Cuba,
but if carried in Spanish vessels they were free of duties. Thus, many of
Huth’s contacts in Spain and Cuba asked him to buy British ships and send
them to Spain to sail them under the Spanish flag40.
Huth also provided many of their connections with important postal
services, at times when mail packet companies were not in operation on
many international routes and communications were slow, expensive and
unreliable. Many foreign merchants sent letters to Huth in London to be
forwarded to diverse destinations. Such was the case of Porrua of Santander,
who sent letters to La Guayra via Huth in London. In the opposite direction,
merchants in distant locations would send letters to London for Huth to
forward to various places. For example, Galceran of Havana was in the habit
of sending letters to Manila via Huth in London41. Finally, Huth also pro-
vided many other petty services, from buying lottery tickets for Lasa of
Havana42, to purchasing London newspapers regularly for many merchants
in Spain.
HUTH AS INSURANCE BROKER FOR SPANISH MERCHANTS
It is well known that merchants engaged in overseas trade were usually
involved in marine insurance during the period covered by this article.
Indeed, among the many commercial activities connecting Huth in London
with Spanish merchants was that of marine insurance. Such was the
importance of this function that it deserves to be treated in a section of its
own. To start with, some preliminary comments seem pertinent. First,
Spanish merchants requested Huth’s insurance services because marine
insurances could be procured in London on better terms than those available
in Spain. London’s marine insurance market was unrivalled across the world
during the 1810s-1840s. Here again, since the firm was based in London,
asymmetrical information was in Huth’s favour, as Spanish traders preferred
to pay him a small commission (0.5 per cent) to effect marine insurance on
their behalf. Spanish traders used London merchant banks’ brokerage rather
than the intermediary services of Spanish merchants based in Spain because
the Spanish insurance industry was very underdeveloped before 185043, and
therefore could not compete with London. This meant that, sooner or later, a
Spanish merchant offering insurance in Spain would need the services of an
intermediary in London or a branch in that city if he wanted to remain
competitive, and neither came free.
40 HPSL-160, Huth to Huth Jr. (Cadiz). London, November 6, 1829.
41 HPSL-177, Huth to Galceran (Havana). London, April 1, 1847.
42 HPSL-159, Huth to Lasa (Havana). London, September 28, 1822.
43 Pons-Pons 2012, pp. 189-190.
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Second, judging from Frederick Huth’s business correspondence, it is
clear that he was extremely averse to risk and insured all trade operations in
which he had any interest, and against all possible risks. This was the case
throughout his career from his early years in London to the late stages of his
enterprise. In turn, and perhaps because of Huth’s extremely cautious atti-
tude towards insurance, he managed to build a crucial reputation among
London underwriters which gave the company a vast network of insurers to
resort to, a network which would have been unavailable to a Spanish mer-
chant operating from Spain.
Third, Huth arranged most, if not all, of the marine insurance of ship-
ments between Britain and Spain in which the firm had any interest, either
as a consignee or as a distant intermediary advancing funds. These included
shipments of wool, wine and many other products from Spain to Britain and
vice versa. Likewise, for shipments between Britain and the Spanish colo-
nies, Huth was also happy to provide insurance brokerage. For example, the
sugar cargoes sent by Vazquez Falcon Echarte of Havana to Britain were
always insured by Huth in London, as were sugar shipments from Puerto
Rico44. If advances given by Huth were involved, then a prerequisite for these
operations to be financed by Huth was that he had to take out the insurance
himself, since the merchandise consigned was taken as collateral. Because
Spanish merchants used so much of Huth’s credit, a logical consequence of
this was that his insurance brokerage had to be widely used too.
In addition, Huth also effected marine insurance for a wide range of Spanish
merchants for shipments from other places (i.e. outside Britain) to Spain (and
her colonies) and vice versa. I am referring to trades, which never docked at
British ports but were insured on the London market. For example, Huth
insured cargoes on behalf of Adalid and Santos (both of Corunna) for shipments
from Havana and Vera Cruz to Cadiz or Corunna45. Huth would also insured
shipments of hides and tallow from Buenos Aires to Spain. Likewise, even
Brentano Urbieta in Hamburg would ask Huth to effect insurance for cargoes
from Lima to Cadiz or to Hamburg, or from Hamburg to Havana46. In the same
vein, the flax trade between Riga and Spain was also insured in London47.
Overall, Huth’s marine insurance services were of great consequence for
Spanish foreign trade because without this service many Spanish traders
would have been reluctant to engage in international trade. Huth & Co. not
only advanced insurance premiums to Spanish merchants, but also made
their vast network of contacts at Lloyds available in order to contract the
insurance services requested from Spain. Thanks to this service Huth prevented
the ruin of several Spanish merchants, since seawater damage was very
44 HPSL-177, Huth to Elzaburu (Puerto Rico). London, January 16, 1847.
45 HPSL-159, Huth to Santos (Corunna). London, August 9, 1822.
46 HPIL, R/38, Entries in Account Current, October 10, 1817.
47 HPEL-6, Huth to Kaull (Riga). London, August 20, 1830.
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common during this period, in particular for cargoes such as textiles, sugar
and tobacco. Perhaps more importantly, shipwrecks were also very common,
and often both ships and cargoes were completely lost. Such was the case of
the Spanish ship San Jacobo, which was loaded with sugar from Havana to
Corunna and Riga, but luckily was insured by Huth on behalf of many
merchants, and for which they claimed £6,000 from the underwriters48.
CONCLUSIONS
The main focus of this paper was to analyse the role played by a London
merchant banker within Anglo-Spanish economic relations and more
generally in relation to Spain’s foreign trade and capital flows during the
1810s-1840s. This «micro» story is important because it improves our
understanding of Spanish international trade, financial services and insur-
ance during the first half of the 19th century. In particular, the article answers
a key question: why did Spanish traders need the services of a London
merchant bank? Why could they not use the services of Spanish institutions
instead? The answer to this question is not to be easily found within the
extant literature or archival material. Unfortunately, merchant banks «have
found little place in either theories of the firm and the multinational enterprise,
or in the history of international business» (Jones 1998, p. 19, 2000, p. 3), while
few of their collections have survived. In addition, merchant banks were an
amorphous group and each enterprise is difficult to characterise. This, however,
makes them an interesting subject of study because many of these firms were
organised and managed in different ways from their more familiar manu-
facturing counterparts. Therefore, merchant banks pose interesting theoretical
challenges for the scholar seeking to explain the different strategies they fol-
lowed (Chapman 1992, pp. 2-3; Casson 1998, p. 32; Jones 2000, pp. 2-4). In this
respect, Huth’s special interest in Spain is unique within the London merchant-
banking community during the first half of the 19th century.
Despite these difficulties, Huth’s experience suggests that London mer-
chant banks were able to provide lower transaction costs to Spanish clients
than those available in Spain. The firm was part of a select group of essential
intermediaries in Spain’s international trade and finance at a time when
trading and moving capital internationally was very risky. Huth effectively
linked Spanish sellers and buyers with traders in the wider world who
otherwise lacked direct contact with sellers and buyers beyond Spain,
making a larger and more secure transaction of goods and securities for their
Spanish clients possible and on better terms than could be procured using
Spanish institutions only. Thus, Huth effectively reduced transaction costs,
as well as the risks inherent in Spain’s international trade and capital flows
48 HPEL-6, Huth to Du Bois (London). London, July 9, 1830.
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because of the lack of information and trust, and the existence of language
and cultural barriers. Huth had invaluable information about so many dif-
ferent markets, products and cultures that few merchants could easily match
them, in particular in Spain. The poor state of both transport and commu-
nications during the first half of the 19th century made Huth’s and other
London merchant bankers’ intermediation crucial in reducing the risks
associated with trading across borders. If, as Jones argued, knowledge about
products and regions was the trading companies’ main asset during the
period covered by this article (Jones 1998, p. 19), then Huth’s «invisible»
capital was truly remarkable.
I have shown how Frederick Huth’s early and increasing knowledge of the
Spanish and Spanish-American markets became a major asset for his firm,
with little incremental cost, and it was used repeatedly for the benefit of all
his correspondents wanting to trade with Spain (and there were thousands of
them). In the same vein, his impressive knowledge of so many products and
regions beyond Spain could also be used at little cost by his correspondents
in Spain who lacked first-hand knowledge of foreign markets, at a time when
the usual pattern for multinational merchants and merchant bankers was to
specialise in one or a few commodities only (Chapman 1984, p. 8). That is, by
specialising in so many products and markets Huth & Co. were able to generate
efficiency gains, thus «selling» information about a market/product to a multi-
plicity of correspondents spreading the information costs across a large number
of clients. Indeed, Huth’s several hundred friends in Spain effectively used their
information and contacts at lower costs than they would have been able to
procure if acting individually without Huth’s intermediation. Huth’s friends
could also use his «invisible» assets because of the high level of trust existing
between Huth and selected agents and friends in Spain.
Indeed, Huth built up a truly global network of trade and lending during
the first half of the 19th century, which managed to accumulate a capital of
over £0.5 m by 1850. Thanks to this impressive enterprise, Huth & Co. were
able to provide great support to the most important bilateral trades between
Spain and Britain during the 1810s-1840s. Namely, Spanish exports of wool
and wine, and Spanish imports of British manufactures and colonial
produce, trades in which they quickly gained great expertise and direct
involvement. Huth also entered actively into trades of Spanish colonial
produce, by trading dynamically in the primary products exported from
Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines. However, they also supported many
trades between Spain and Spanish colonies with other parts of the world
beyond British ports, often involving complex multilateral trades, thus
helping Spanish merchants from all over Spain to trade with the wider
world. Indeed, the geographical dispersion and huge numbers of their con-
tacts in Spain can only be described as breathtaking. Huth decided to go
global well before any other competitor, thus defying the conventional
wisdom of the era (Llorca-Jan˜a 2013).
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Apart from direct support to Spain’s import/export operations (and to the
Spanish colonies’ foreign trade), Huth & Co. also provided other key services to
their Spanish correspondents in addition to dealing in goods. These encom-
passed the liberal extension of credit to Spanish exporters, as well as to Spanish
importers from many parts of the world. Huth also financed Spanish colonial
trades and Spanish imports from non-British ports. That is, the firm was actually
financing many Spanish foreign trade operations, even if they never docked at
British ports. Huth was able to provide these services to Spanish merchants
because he was resident in London and Britain was the main source of credit for
financing international trade at that time. Likewise, Huth was keen to provide
various kinds of marine and fire insurance services for Spanish merchants, given
London’s supremacy in the international insurance market at that time.
Apart from the extension of credit and the brokerage of insurance, Huth
also provided a wide range of other financial services to his Spanish corre-
spondents, by dealing in medium-term and long-term securities, thus
becoming actively involved in capital flows «in» and «out» of Spain. Thanks
to Frederick Huth’s connections with the Spanish crown he became the main
conduit of Spanish investments in American securities during the first half of
the 19th century. In this case Huth’s intermediation is explained by his
superior information of the US securities market compared with the infor-
mation available to most potential Spanish investors in Madrid, but was also
a consequence of his political influence. Huth’s securities intermediation was
also because of his international reputation, which made him a preferred
option for the Americans to float their securities in London instead of trying
to sell them directly on the Spanish market. The reputation of London
merchant bankers and their knowledge of the American market would have
been regarded by potential Spanish buyers as a mark of trust in the securities
Huth was offering in Europe, undoubtedly reassuring potential investors.
Furthermore, Americans issuing securities often requested advances to those
floating their shares or bonds, and Huth could grant this credit on better
terms than Spanish bankers thanks to the ample capital of the firm. Likewise,
this merchant banker was also of paramount importance in clearing bills of
exchange balances between Britain and Spain by negotiating acceptance and
exchange rates. Overall, it is perhaps surprising that a London enterprise that
originated mainly in Spain had become so instrumental in boosting Spanish
foreign trade and, just a few years later, in providing various commercial and
financial services, many of which were scarce but in high demand in Spain. It
is also astounding that we knew so little about the Spanish connections of
this prominent London merchant banker.
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